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IN THE SUPREME COURT 










NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action on a Policy of Insurance designated as 
a Special Risk Group Policy wherein the Respondent was the 
named beneficiary. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before a Jury which returned its ver-
dict for the Plaintiff on April 12, 1972. Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial was denied by the Trial Judge on June 28, 
1972. The Trial Judge issued the following Memorandum 
Decision ( R. 146) : 
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"The Court assumed the responsibility imposed 
by Dienes vs. Safeco and interpreted the policy. The 
instructions given by the Court isolated the factual 
issues and required a finding of bodily injury (which 
could have been internal) caused by accident (unusual 
stress and strain as permitted under Utah cases) and 
required the jury to negative death due to natural 
progression of arteriosclerosis. The fact issue, to-wit: 
the cause of death was properly submitted to the jury 
and the issue was resolved in Plaintiffs favor. 
The Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict or New Trial is therefore denied." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent cannot accept the Statement of Facts set forth 
m the Brief of Appellant for two very important reasons. 
First, the testimony and reasonable inferences derived there-
from is not set forth in the light most favorable to respondent. 
Second, Appellant has considered as non-existent certain testi-
mony of major importance. As an example we call attention 
to the testimony of Dr. Clyde Null with regard to cause of 
death. We cite as a case in support of our position Holland 
v. Moreton 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 Pac.2d 989, where the court 
stated: 
". . . once the ] ury has found for the plaintiffs, 
they are entitled to have the Supreme Court review the 
evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be 
drawn therefrom in light most favorable to them and 
their contentions." 
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As her Statement of Facts, the Respondent submits the 
following: 
(a) The decedent, during the last six weeks of his life, 
wets tmder unusual mental and physical stress and strain. 
At the trial of this matter, the Respondent called as her 
witnesses those who knew the decendent best to testify con-
cerning the last six weeks of his life. 
D. Frank Wilkins, a colleague of the decedent, Judge 
Elton, who had adjacent chambers, testified as to his observa-
tions during the period in question. ( R. 17 2) . He explained 
that Judge Elton had assumed cases involving sensitive matters 
and that during this period of time he (the decedent) was with-
drawn, less communicative and appeared to be more concerned 
about these cases than usual, (R. 177) and that he commenced 
taking home an unusual amount of work and was extremely 
busy. ( R. 178) . He testified further, that the decedent was 
the Presiding Judge during the period in question and in addi-
tion to his normal assignments, he had this administrative 
function. ( R. 179). It was Judge Wilkins observation that he 
was taking more work home than any other District Judge (R. 
182) and assigned the sensitive cases during this period to him-
self. Although he could have assigned said cases to others, he 
did not. (R. 185). Judge Wilkins concluded his testimony by 
stating that during this period Judge Elton was working 
harder than he usually did and was working harder as a Pre-
siding Judge than other Presiding Judges had done in the 
past. (R. 195). 
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The District Attorney for the Third Judicial District, 
Jay E. Banks, testified concerning one of these publicized cases 
that Judge Elton had in April of 1970 known as the Ronnow 
case. ( R. 197) . He testified as to the pressure of public officials 
and the type of telephone calls that the Judge received at home 
which were critical of his action on this matter. (R. 204). That 
in his years as District Attorney he had observed that the custom 
and practice in such cases as the Ronnow case was to assign 
them to a Judge outside of the District, and that it was highly 
unusual for a Judge to hold onto this type of "sensitive" case. 
( R. 218) . During this period of time he observed the pres-
sures put on the Judge ( R. 222) occasioned by the phone 
calls and the unusual publicity that was given to the case 
both before and after the sentencing of Ronnow ( R. 204, 
206). Mr. Banks further testified that the decedent exper-
ienced a dramatic personality change ( R. 206) and that he be-
came withdrawn and that a recognizable physical change oc-
curred in his appearance when he was subjected to the pres-
sure of this case. (R. 207). 
Mr. Harold Waldo, Jr., an attorney m Salt Lake City, 
testified about another case that Judge Elton handled during the 
period in question. This was the Sunday Closing Law case. 
Mr. Waldo testified as to the great controversy involved in 
this case as the result of a request for injunctive relief by his 
clients. Because of the nature of the case and the need Judge 
Elton felt for haste, Mr. Waldo stated that he fixed "strenuous 
time tables for both the attorneys and himself to meet". (R. 
234). During this period "there was many editorials written 
by the newspapers and there was extensive television coverage, 
and many stories written about the coverage of the law and the 
aspects of how it would affect the community and so forth. So 
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it was very widely and extensively debated" (R. 233, 234). 
Because of the time limitation all of the parties represented by 
"at least twenty attorneys" ( R. 23 5) commenced preparation 
which even required work on holidays. (R. 235). Mr. Waldo 
testified in some detail as to the appearance of the Judge on 
May 6, 1970 during the legal arguments made to him which 
lasted for one complete day. ( R. 238, 239). He stated that 
he had never been involved in as extensive a hearing as the 
one in question. ( R. 2 3 8) . That during the morning in ques-
tion, the Judge seemed quite alert and asked numerous and var-
ious questions. He states that 
"You could see that he had a real concern about 
the point that he was asking the question on". 
As the afternoon went on the Judge became "very notice-
ably tired" and when he would speak "his words were slower 
and drawn out and somewhat labored" ( R. 239). 
As was shown by subsequent testimony, Judge Elton be-
came ill prior to the time he was to make his decision, how-
ever, made the same on May 12, the day before his death. On 
the date in question, the Courtroom was crowded with attor-
neys, newsmen, television people and other interested parties. 
When the ] udge ascended the bench: 
"It was apparent that he was quite tired, because 
he took a considerable period of time to get up to the 
Bench and to seat himself in his chair. He then an-
nounced the decision and, again, in a rather unusual 
way, I thought. He normally spoke in quite a booming 
voice, but on this occasion he spoke very low and he 
was really a little difficult to hear." ( R. 240). 
Mr. Waldo re-emphasized in cross-examination that 
Leonard Elton looked markedly tired on May 12, 1972. 
Both Judge Elton's Clerk and Bailiff testified at the trial 
in this matter. His Clerk testified that he seemed to be under 
a lot of pressure with the Sunday Closing Law, Kennecott 
Copper Case and the Ronnow case. ( R. 2 5 9) . He testified that 
on some occasions the work load that the Judge assumed would 
require him to work through his lunch and he would go home 
at 5: 30 or 6: 00 p.m. with a "briefcase full of files". He noted 
that Judge Elton became very tired and irritable ( R. 260). He 
further testified that he had worked for other District Judges 
and that the pressure and work load that Leonard was exper-
iencing was difficult and unusual. ( R. 262). His Bailiff, David 
]. Shewell, testified to the heavy load that Judge Elton was 
working on and his heavy work habits during the last days 
of his life. (R. 274). 
Felshaw King, an attorney from Davis County and an 
acquaintance of the Judge, testified that the day before his 
death, he had an ex-parte matter before the Judge ( R. 289) 
and he described his condition as being haggard ( R. 290) and 
that Judge Elton indicated that he had been working quite 
hard on pending matters and com plained about the strain be-
cause of what he felt was the unusual nature of the cases and 
being in receipt of "disruptive and abusive calls". ( R. 291) . 
The person closest, however, to the Judge during this 
period of time was, of course, his wife, the Respondent in this 
matter. She testified as to the unusual work patterns of Judge 
Elton during the period in question. ( R. 292). She testified 
that he was dragging (R. 305) and that he was extremely 
bothered by the abusive phone calls received in regards to the 
Ronnow case ( R. 296) ( R. 301) and that he spent weekends, 
evenings and waking hours reading and preparing for the 
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pending cases. ( R. 297). In addition to this, he commenced 
skipping lunches ( R. 298) and commenced working both at 
home and at the off ice on Saturdays and Sundays. ( R. 298). 
The night prior to the legal arguments on the Sunday Closing 
Law case, May 5, 1970, the decedent because of the stress and 
pressure suffered from a bizarre loss of memory. Mrs. Elton 
testified: 
"Q. All right. Would you please tell the jury what 
happened on the evening of May 5, that is, the day 
before the arguments on May 6, 1970. 
A. Well, he had been to work. He came home and 
he went to bed early. And later on in the evening, like 
I always did, I always go in and check on him and say 
good night and so forth. And as I did, he was just lying 
there and staring right straight out. 
Q. Mrs. Elton, what time was this in the evening? 
A. This was about 11 : 00 o'clock at night. 
Q. All right. Please continue, I am sorry. 
A. And so I talked to him. And at first he didn't 
respond. And as I kept talking to him, I could see he 
was far distant away. He had lost his memory com-
pletely. He didn't know who he was. He didn't know 
at first who I was. And he didn't know where he was. 
He didn't - absolutely didn't know anything. He 
completely lost his memory. And I tried to talk to him, 
to bring him back. And then he went out of the bed 
and went into the front room, the living room. So I 
called my children, an~ we were sitting there to 3: 00 
or 3: 30 in the morning. And he kept asking all these 
questions. He had all these law books and things he had 
been studying the night before, and he said what are 
these. And what are they for. And we tried to revive 
his memory, but it was just gone. So - and he was 
taking notes all the time, everything I told him he took 
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notes that he was working on this particular thing, 
and his name was so and so, and he was a Judge, you 
know, and so forth. He wrote all these things down. 
Anyway, I called the doctor, and the doctor told 
me that he was - had worked too hard mentally, and 
that I had to relax his mind. The only way I can do 
it is to give him a sleeping tablet and put him back 
to bed." 
In addition to working his regular shift and working nights 
and weekends and holidays there was pending matters in the 
morning, prior to the normal work day, in the determination 
of Grand Jury matters (R. 303). 
Mrs. Elton, on cross-examination, in a sense, summed up 
her observations of the last six weeks of her husband's life: 
"A. Well, he did, but I mean the way I was able to 
observe my husband, it was because I know he had his 
regular duties in Court, he had - he was - he had 
this Ronnow, this Sunday Closing was sort of over-
lapping in preparing, and he spent every single minute 
studying. Like I said, even Sundays, Saturdays and Sun-
days. And this involved the whole family. It was just 
plain miserable. And I could see he was building up 
this pressure. And I told - there was nothing I could 
do about it. But this is what I feel was it just came to 
a climax. 
Q. Was he also - did his pallor in his face - did 
he become gray and ashen? 
A. Yes, I could see that he was looking tired. 
Q. And he became withdrawn? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And moody? 
A. He was terrible moody. He withdrew from my 
children. He wouldn't even help them with homework 
or he withdrew from us all. He was just like he was in 
a different world by himself. 
Q. And you said that there towards the end, if I 
understand it, he was really ragged, is that right? 
A. Yes. He was 
MR. HANSON: That's all." (R. 313). 
( b) The medical evidence tendered by the Respondent 
showed that the unusual strain that the decedent was under 
precipitated his death. 
Much ado is made by Appellant in its Brief on the opin-
ions and the conclusions of its two expert witnesses. It is stipu-
lated by the Respondent that the Appellant did not call two 
witnesses which corroborated the plaintiff's theory in this case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the copious quoting and sum-
marizing of the testimony of opinions of experts, which opinions 
contradicted the plaintiff's experts, is of no help to an Appel-
late Court in determining whether or not error was committed. 
However, what is more critical is the fact that the Appel-
lant's Brief does not disclose the true impact of the medical 
testimony of the witnesses called by the Respondent. Perhaps 
this medical testimony is summed up most succinctly in the last 
paragraph of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6. (On Cross-examination 
the Appellant brought out the fact that Dr. Null had originally 
reviewed this case when he was appointed as Chairman of a 
medical panel for the Industrial Commission of Utah. Counsel 
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for Appellant attempted to refer to this prior opinion and, as 
such, he, of course, opened the matter up and the Exhibit was 
properly before the Court. [R. 386, 395 and 396}). The last 
paragraph of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6 states as follows: 
"Assuming but not deciding that the Deceased 
was involved in the events as alleged, the Panel find 
that the record is clearly indicative of marked emotional 
and physical stress superimposed upon an individual 
with severe vascular disease as manifested by the pre-
viously outlined central nervous system manifestation 
of vascular insufficiency. It is the opinion of the Panel 
that the job activities, characterized by marked physical 
and emotional stress in this circumstance, most prob-
ably markedly aggravated the underlying condition and 
did indeed precipitate the Decedent's death." 
Counsel for Appellant, on cross-examination, confirmed 
the fact that the opinions of the medical panel report were the 
opinions of Dr. Null. The testimony at (R. 398) shows: 
"Q. Dr., this is not your opinion, is it? 
A. I beg your pardon. 
Q. This is not your opinion is it? 
A. Yes. It is. 
Q. This is the opinion of three doctors, is it not? 
A. That is correct, but it is also my opinion." 
Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple, the decedent's treating physi-
cian and a Board Certified Internist, testified as to the medical 
history of the decedent. On January 9, 1969, Dr. Dalrymple 
testified that Judge Elton suffered a stroke. ( R. 317). Prior 
to that time, he appeared in good health, was symptom free 
from any cardiovascular difficulty and there was no indica-
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tion of any physical impairment. He had not, for many years, 
been under medical care. ( R. 3 15, 316) . He was hospitalized 
subsequent to his stroke for a time and then returned to part-
time employment. By the fall of 1969 he resumed his judicial 
duties and was working full time. (R. 323, 324). 
In January of 1970 he assumed the responsibility of Pre-
siding Judge of the Third District. These responsibilities, as 
shown by Judge Wilkins' testimony, heretofore referred to, 
substantially increased the Judge's work load. 
From the time he resumed his full judicial duties until 
April 20, 1970 Judge Elton saw his doctor monthly without 
complaints or medical findings relating to vascular difficulty. 
(R. 324, 325). On April 21, 1970 after seeing Dr. Dalrymple 
the day before on an uneventful visit, he came to his off ice 
claiming of dizziness. The doctor testified that: 
"A. His wife brought him into my office because he 
had a sudden onset of dizziness. His wife was holding 
him up. He was cold and clammy, and he had what is 
known as an astigmatism. In other words, if you look 
at something it is blurred. And it implies something 
wrong at the base of the brain. And he was quite sick 
to his stomach, but did not vomit. 
Q. Did you form an opinion at that time what caused 
the condition from which he was suffering? 
A. Yes, sir, I assumed he had had another stroke?" 
(It should be pointed out at this juncture, that the flare-
up described above occurred during the period of time when 
Judge Elton was receiving the abusive calls as a result of the 
sentencing in the Ronnow Case and was in the middle of the 
preparation of the Sunday Closing Law Case). 
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Dr. Dalrymple testified that he, again, saw Judge Elton 
on the 2nd day of May, 1970 and noted that he was "extremely 
emotionally upset at that time". 
The doctor also testified that just immediately prior to 
the decedent's death, he was under undue stress. (R. 332). Dr. 
Dalrymple also refuted the Appellant's claim that the stroke 
of May 13, 1970 was pre-destined in that he, as his treating 
physician, did not anticipate the same and was surprised be-
cause "I did not think he was going to die that fast". (R. 332, 
359). He also refuted the fact that the stress that Judge Elton 
was under was due to fear that he might die. (R. 357). 
As stated earlier, the Respondent called in addition to the 
treating physician as her expert, Dr. Clyde Null. ( R. 362). 
Dr. Null is a Board Certified Internist with a subspecialty in 
cardiovascular diseases (R. 363) and is also a fellow in the 
American College of Physicians (R. 367). The doctor based his 
opinion and conclusions at the trial in this matter upon the 
autopsy report, the medical records and the hypothetical ques-
tions tendered to him (the hypothetical questions that were 
tendered to him were not objected to by the Appellant). 
Th doctor testified to the fact that on May 13, 1970 Judge 
Elton suffered a cerebral occlusion. However, the autopsy re-
port failed to disclose whether or not the occlusion was brought 
about by a new clot or whether there was an alteration in one 
of the vessel walls. The doctor stated, however, that as far as 
the physiological changes that occurred, it did not matter which 
internal failure happened. (R. 369). 
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The type of stroke that Judge Elton had in January of 
1969 and May of 1970 are referred to medically as a "cere-
bral vascular accident". ( R. 3 70). 
After explaining the mechanism of a cerebral vascular 
accident, the doctor was asked a hypothetical question based 
upon the testimony tendered by the lay witnesses. The doctor 
was asked if he could testify with reasonable medical certainry 
as to his opinion as to the effect the activities of the last six 
weeks of his life had in regard to Judge Elton's death. The doc-
tor responded (R. 377) as follows: 
"A. I certainly think it aggravated the underlying situ-
ation and undoubtedly markedly aggravated his cere-
bral vascular disease." 
He went on to state that this aggravation of the under-
! y ing condition brought about his death. ( R. 3 7 8) . In this 
connection he testified that there is a wealth of clinical infor-
mation that shows when persons are placed under chronic stress 
that such stress aggravates arteriosclerosis. In this connection 
he stated that strokes are a consequence of many factors in-
volving the tissues and alterations of the tissues in regard to 
their requirement for oxygen and that these factors are altered 
by stress. He states as follows : 
"And there is little question that individuals subjected 
to harrassment, stress, who are ill because of pre-exist-
ing strokes, heart attacks, what have you, or just arteri-
osclerosis anywhere will be made worse by this rype 
of activiry. 
Q. In your opinion is this what happened in this case? 
A. I think so." (R. 379). 
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On cross-examination counsel for Appellant attempted 
to reinforce his position that one that has arteriosclerosis is 
suffering from progressive disease and as such is destined to 
die from this progression. The doctor responded to this ap-
proach by stating: 
"Q. And when you - and when the condition gets 
so bad - I mean eventually this person, as the condi-
tion progresses, is going to die from the progression 
of this condition? 
A. That's not really necessarily true, sir. It is a com-
mon clinical observation that we cannot always - we 
simply can't answer all of these in that fashion. People 
will have a stroke, they will have symptoms of vascular 
insufficiency and this will go on for years, and others 
do not. And there are a whole host of factors which 
influence that. ( R. 383). 
Again on cross-examination the doctor reasserted his posi-
tion that in this particular case Judge Elton's death was 
brought about by being "markedly aggravated by the underlying 
stress which he was subject to" ( R. 384, 389). He stated fur-
ther on cross examination as follows: 
"A. And I do not think that the majority of the peo-
ple are subject to this particular degree of stress in the 
same situation, no, sir." (R. 384). 
Throughout the Appellant's Brief and throughout the 
record on appeal on cross-examination, great emphasis is made 
by the Appellant in stating that Judge Elton's strokes occurred 
during periods of rest and as such the stress activities could not 
be related to his death. Dr. Dalyrmple, the treating physician, 
negated this contention. ( R. 3 31) . In order to clarify the Re-
spondent's position in regards to the assertion of the defend-
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ant, Dr. Null was asked directly whether or not the fact that 
he was at home at the time of the stroke affected the doctor's 
opinion as to the fact that the stress triggered Judge Elton's 
death. The doctor answered clearly and unequivocally that 
what seems to be a paradox of individuals under chronic stress 
is an extremely common occurrence. The doctor stated: 
And what effect does this relief have in regards 
to your opinion on stress? 
A. It doesn't really have any. This has always been 
a paradox, it has always been an interesting observation 
in medicine, that individuals under chronic stress will 
have heart attacks and so forth, strokes, not necessarily 
during the time that they have a tremendous amount of 
pressure on them emotionally and tensionwise, but will 
occur frequently at a later time when the stress period 
is over. There have been a number of investigative 
studies in an effort to answer why that should be so 
because people would naturally say well the stress 
obviously had nothing to do with it because he was over 
the stress, he was rested twenty-four hours later and 
then it happened. . . . But it has been observed in 
investigative studies that these reactions in the body 
reach their peak at times, well, twenty-four hours after 
the original stress, after the real pressure was there on 
people. So it is not surprising, it is a clinical observa-
tion, it has some backing in research material which has 
been demonstrated. So we do have appreciation, we 
do not have a full understanding of it, neither do we 
have a full understanding of arteriosclerosis. But we 
do have this observation, and it is quite valid." (R. 
392, 393). 
It would seem, therefore, that the defendant's contention that 
the stroke was not related to stress is clearly refuted by the 
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medical testimony; and, the defendant is merely re-arguing 
another factual matter that was determined against it by the 
Jury. 
At the close of the plaintiff's case in this matter the de-
fendant made a motion for a directed verdict. It is respectfully 
suggested that the trial jury properly analyzed the status of the 
evidence at that time in his denial of such motion. The court 
stated what the legal issues were in accordance with the law 
in the State of Utah. He stated that he would leave for the 
jury the factual determination of whether or not the stress of 
his activities immediately prior to Judge Elton's death consti-
tuted an accident and caused the occlusion or stroke. ( R. 416) 
We agree with the trial judge that there was credible evidence 
that the activities of Judge Elton were unusual, that the stress 
was extra-ordinary and that the medical evidence showed that 
this brought about the death of the decedent. 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE VERDICT. 
A. The nature of the Policy. 
The Policy which is the subject of the claim of the Re-
spondent in the case is truly unique. As stated earlier, the 
Policy in this case is designated by the Insurer-Appellant as a 
Special Risk Group Policy No. SR 82508. The Policy provides 
for coverage for loss of life, loss of two or more members, loss 
of one member and permanent total disability (as defined) . 
There is also a weekly income benefit and a medical expense 
provision. Attached hereto and made a part of this Brief, in 
the Appendix, is a copy of said Policy which was attached to 
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the Complaint and admitted as being a true copy of the Policy 
in question, in Appellant's Answer. 
The Policy in quesion insofar as it is relevant to the issues 
in this case provides for coverage when there is an "injury". 
The Policy states: 
"Injury" whenever used in this certificate means 
bodily injury occurring while the group policy is in 
force as to the Insured Person or Insured Dependent 
whose injury is the basis of claim and causing the loss 
directly and independently of all other causes and ef-
fect solely through an accidental bodily injury to the 
Insured Person or Insured Dependent." 
The Policy, therefore, provides coverage for injury. The phrase 
"causing the loss directly and independently of all other causes" 
modifies either the word claim or the word injury. When oc-
curring in classical policies, this modification goes to the word 
accident or accidental means. The uniqueness of the Policy is 
further compounded by the fact that the Insurer fails to define, 
as most policies do, the words "injury" and "accidental bodily 
injury". The types of policies which have been most frequently 
construed by the Courts define with specificity what is meant 
by "accident", "accidental injury" or "accidental bodily injury". 
The following are some of the typical phrases that are used: 
( 1) Bodily injury effected solely through external vio-
lent and accidental means. 
( 2) Bodily injuries effected directly and independently 
of all other causes through external, violent, and acci-
dental means. 
( 3 ) There must be a "visible" wound or contusion. 
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(See 93 ALR 2d 578 at Page 579, Footnote (2).) 
Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New 
York, 106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319. 
The obvious purpose of Insurers in defining "accident" in 
the manner set forth above is to limit their coverage to those types 
of instances where external and violent acts bring about the 
death. Not only, as stated above, is there no limiting definition 
of the words "injury" and "accidental bodily injury'', the Policy 
in question uses these two phrases interchangeably within the 
Policy. See Part Six entitled "Exclusions" where in Paragraph 
6 the word "accidents" is used and in Paragraph 7 the word 
"injury" is used. 
Another uncommon aspect of the Policy is found in Part 
Six which is entitled 'Exclusions". There is no exclusion for loss 
which is contributed or which results in whole or in part from 
bodily sickness or disease. Again, typical of the language found 
in most exclusionary provisions of "accidental policies" are: 
( 1 ) This policy does not cover any loss or disability 
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
from (a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease; See 
Whitlock vs. Old American Insurance Company, 21 
Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, or 
( 2) Or death resulting directly or indirectly from 
bodily or mental infirmity. See First National Bank of 
Birmingham vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society of The 
United States, 144 Southern 451. 
In summary, therefore, the Policy in this case covers "in-
jury" and does not have the classical language requiring that 
there must be an "accident" which is "violent" or "external" and 
does not exclude as a contributing cause "bodily sickness or 
disease". The Respondent, of course, points out these facts at 
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this time for the reason that some of the cases relied upon by 
Appellant bottom their holdings on the qualifying language 
quoted above, which is not present in the Policy in question. 
Further, Courts have construed insurance policies which do 
not have the limiting language as in this case in a much more 
liberal manner than if such language had been present. Basic-
ally, the Appellant is making legal arguments as if the Policy 
in question had the limiting and qualifying language which 
was not present in this case. 
B. The Trial Court required the Respondent to show 
that the decedent died as a result of an accident. 
Point I of the Appellant's Brief is concerned with per-
suading this Court that there was a requirement that the de-
cedent died as a result of an accident. This Point, it is respect-
fully submitted, is irrelevant in view of the fact that the trial 
court submitted the issue of whether an accident had occurred 
to the jury and the jury resolved that issue against appellant. 
Much ado i3 made by the Appellant as to the position taken by 
the Respondent in her Trial Memorandum (The Respondent 
did take the position and cited authority to the effect that she 
was entitled to a direct verdict. The Court, however, denied this 
Motion ( R. 48 5, 486) and proceeded on the basis outlined 
above.) The instructions to the Jury which will be discussed in 
Point IV show that the case was properly presented and was 
presented under the theory that the Appellant is now urging. 
C. The Utah Law sustains plaintiff's theory 
As set forth in our Statement of Facts, the Plaintiff pro-
ceeded on the theory and the testimony sustained the fact that 
the decedent, immediately prior to his death, was under undue 
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stress and strain, and that said str/n precipitated his death. A 
remarkably similar case was ~;-this Court in a unanimous 
decision in 1968 in the case of Thompson vs. American Cas-
ualty Company, 20 Utah 2d, 439 P.2d 276. The Trial Court 
in that case found as a matter of law, based upon deposition and 
affidavits, that the Claimant did not sustain an accident. This 
Court stated, at the commencement of its opinion, th'at the 
" .. pivotal question is whether or not the disability resulted 
from accidental means as provided in the insurance contract". 
The record in the Thompson case, Supra. showed that the 
Plaintiff was employed by the State of Utah as a custodian and 
maintenance man. The facts were that on July 13, 1964 he 
assumed duties and tasks which required him to use an electric 
jackhammer of 3 5 to 40 pounds. During the week in which 
he performed this task, he experienced feelings of exhaustion 
at the end of each working day. On Saturday, the Plaintiff 
rested at home. On Sunday, the following day, he drove with 
his wife on a short trip to visit relatives. That night, that is 
some 48 hours subsequent to his job activities, he was awaken-
ed from his sleeping by seizures and was rushed to a hospital 
where his condition was described as "a prolonged generalized 
status of epilepticus, with a left side emphasis". 
It is interesting to note that the plaintiff's prior medical 
history was strikingly similar to the medical history of the de-
cedent in this case. The history shows ( 1) An injury some 
28 years prior thereto which necessitated brain surgery; ( 2) 
arteriosclerosis cerebral vascular disease and ( 3) pulmonary 
emphysema. We have, therefore, the same situation that was 
presented in this case --evidence of unusual activity, fatigue 
and a resulting physiological disorder. This Court discussed the 
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Utah Law and ruled that the Trial Judge erred because there 
was a general issue of fact as to whether or not the condition 
of the Plaintiff was "unexpected and unforeseen in considera-
tion of his health and physical condition prior to and during 
the time he engaged in this drilling." This Court therefore, 
has held that evidence of unusual exertion and stress raises a 
Jury question of whether or not the loss was brought about 
by accident. 
Of course, the Respondent now relies on the recent case 
of Inga-Lill Elton vs. The Utah State Retirement Board, No. 
12809, decided by this Court on November 15, 1972. The 
facts as to the activities of the decedent are identical to the facts 
which were found by the Trial Court in the case at bar. 
The Court, in arriving at its decision, construed the langu-
age of the Judicial Retirement Act, (Section 49-7-4, UC.A., 
1953, as amended) which provides in part as folliows: 
" ... every Judge who is killed by accident ansmg 
out of or in the course of his employment . . ." 
and found that the exertion experienced by the decedent con-
stituted an accident under Utah Law. As discussed earlier, the 
Policy in question in this case affords coverage "for an accident". 
The Utah Court has discussed the meaning of the word 
"accident" in insurance policies. See Richards vs. Standard 
Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017. The 
Court in this case stated: 
The rule of applying the popular meaning to words 
found in insurance policies is doubly strengthened when 
the additional rule is invoked that insurance policies 
should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat 
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the purpose of insurance. In this connection we call 
attention to the workmen's compensation cases on the 
subject of sunstroke, which offer a striking analogy to 
the case at bar. 
The English Workmen's Compensation Law provides 
that compensation is granted to employees who "sus-
tain personal injuries by accident," with the further 
provision that the accident must grow out of and be 
in the course of the employment. "Personal injuries by 
accident," and 'bodily injuries by accidental means," 
cannot be differentiated without resorting to subtle and 
refined distinctions. If injury or death by sunstroke is 
within the purview of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 
why is it not covered by an insurance policy that in-
sures against loss resulting from bodily injuries by 
accidental means? (Page 631. Emphasis added.) 
This Court, therefore, has concluded in an insurance acci-
dent case, that evidence of unusual activity and exertion con-
stitutes a Jury question as to whether or not benefits are afford-
ed. See Thompson vs. American Casualty Company, Supra. 
This Court has held that stress and death brought about by un-
usual activities constitutes an accident within the meaning of the 
Judicial Retirement Act. See Elton vs. The Utah State Re-
tirement Board, Supra. This Court has held that exertion in 
the course of employment is covered under the Utah Compensa-
tion Act for accidents. See Powers vs. The Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P2d 740, 1967 cited with the 
approval in Elton vs. Utah State Retirement Board, Supra. To 
argue, therefore, that under the facts of this case, after a favor-
able Jury verdict, Judge Elton's death was not an accident 
would be "resorting to subtle and refined distinctions" which 
this Court has clearly rejected in Richards vs. Standard Accident 
Insurance Company, Supra. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE PROPOSI-
TION THAT JUDGE ELTON'S DEATH WAS 
DUE TO ACCIDENT. 
We have heretofore, in Point I, cited authority which 
shows that under fact situations, similar to those in the case 
at bar, this Court has supported findings as to the existence 
of accidents. Inherent within the Appellant's argument, that 
Judge Elton's death was foreseeable and not unexpected, are 
certain factual determinations and arguments that are not sup-
ported by the record. In Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
strenuous effort is made to convince this Court that Judge 
Elton died from a progressive disease. The record overwhelm-
ingly shows, however, that his death was due to unusual stress 
which shortened his life, and that he (the decedent) was not 
predestined to die on May 13, 1970 from a stroke. 
We submit that under the cases cited by the Appellant, 
the Respondent's theory of accident is sustained. 
In its Point I, the Appellant cites Richards vs. Standard 
Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 
( 1921), as some authority to sustain his theory that no accident 
occurred. Initially, the Appellant argues that "there was ap-
parently no disease exclusion in the Policy in question". The 
fact of the matter is that there was such exclusion in Richards 
which is evidenced by the protracted discussion as to whether 
or not sunstroke would be considered "bodily injury" or "dis-
ease". In any event, the issue presented was whether or not 
there was an accident, since it was argued, as in this case, that 
the decedent voluntarily exposed himself to the danger in ques-
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tion and reasonably could have anticipated or foreseen the re-
sulting injury . . . that is, the sunstroke. 
The same argument was, therefore, made in that case as 
is being made in this case by the Appellant. The Court stated, 
as to the contention of foreseeability and unexpectedness: 
"But Richards was pursuing his usual occupation. 
He was under no duty to stop at the six mile point 
and weigh the probability as to whether there might 
be danger. He was following his vocation and had a 
right to proceed * * *" 
"Unless the deceased intended to produce the 
very result which occurred, the element of danger is 
both unimportant and immaterial ... " 
It should also be noted that in the Richards case the Court di-
rected a verdict for the Plaintiff. We see nothing inconsistent 
between the holding of that case and the case at bar. 
Appellant further cites Handley vs. Mutual Life Insur-
ance of New York, 106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 ( 1944) to 
sustain his position. This case holds in Respondent's favor. It 
is interesting to note the Court in that case analyzes Richards, 
Supra., and negates the Appellant's proposition that a finding 
of an accidental, unexpected or unforseen event was necessary 
in order to consitute an "accident". There the Court stated with 
reference to the Richards case: 
"Having determined that sunstroke was an in-
jury, it chose also to rest the decision on the ground 
that even though the extra journey was not accidental 
but intended, the result was unexpected, unanticipated 
and, therefore, accidental." 
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Further, that Court cites the Richards decision wherein it de-
fines the me'aning of the word "accident'', stating: 
" ... an effect which is not the natural or prob-
able consequence of the means which produced it, an 
effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be 
reasonably anticipated from the use of these means, 
an effect which the actor did not intend to produce, and 
which he cannot be charged with the design of pro-
ducing under the maxim to which we have adverted 
(that every man must be held to intend the natural 
and probable consequence of his deeds) , is produced by 
accidental means. It is produced by means which were 
neither designed nor calculated to cause it ... " (Hand-
ley, Page 323 Pac. 192 Utah). (Parenthesis ours) 
Appellant also cites Whatcott vs. Continental Casualty 
Company, 85 Utah 406, 39 P.2d 723. The Respondent has no 
quarrel with this case and agrees that the result of death, from 
the Insured's hypersusceptibility to novocain, was unexpected 
and an unforeseen result. 
Appellant also cites Kellogg vs. California Western States 
Life Insurance Company, 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949. This 
case is of no help to Appellant for the holding of the case is 
bottomed on the conclusion that the death was a result of dis-
ease and such risk was specifically excluded from the Policy. 
The distinction made between Handley and Whatcott, on 
one hand and Kellogg, on the other hand, based on the prior 
medical history of the Insured, is spurious. The true distinction 
is the type of Policy which was in issue. 
As stated, the Respondent has no quarrel with the 8ililn-
Utah cases cited by Pl'aintiff when there was a struggle in de-
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fining the difficult situations which would constitute an aco-
dent. 
Recently, however, these cases and their holdings have 
been summarized. For example, in Thompson vs. American 
Casualty, Supra., the Court, in sustaining the proposition that 
it was a jury question as to whether or not an accident occurred, 
found that unusual stress and strain meets the test of an acci-
dent in that said occurrence is unexpected and unforeseen. The 
Court stated: 
"There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
Plaintiff's disability was unexpected, and unforeseen 
in consideration of his health and physical condition 
prior to and during the time he was engaged in the 
drilling work." 
The Court in arriving at this conclusion, cited as its 
authority, Whatcott vs. Continental Casualty Company, Supra.; 
Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance of New York, Supra., and 
Kellogg vs. California Western States Life Insurance Company, 
Supra., authority that Appellant now claims sustains his posi-
tion that there was no accident. 
Cases from other jurisdictions also sustain the Respond-
ent's position in this case. In Pectrce vs. Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Company of California, 109 P.2d 322, involved 
a factual situation where the Insured was almost involved 
in an automobile accident. The mental stress, according 
to the testimony, caused him to suffer from a stroke. The 
Court negated the position that, since mental stress was not 
accompanied by physical impact, the facts were not sufficient 
to constitute an accident. Also, see Little vs. ]. Caber & Co., 
71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119, which involved an employee who 
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became emotionally upset because of his work activities. The 
evidence showed that the Claimant had a serious preexist-
ing arteriosclerotic condition. The Court held that the 
emotional stress was sufficient to constitute an accident. Also, 
see Schechter vs. State Insurance Fund, 6 N.Y. 2d 506, 190 
N.Y. Supp. 2d 656, involving a trial lawyer who had an in-
crease in his work load and suffered from a cardiovascular dis-
order. The evidence showed that he was doing more work than 
usual for him and that, as a result, this activity set into motion 
his cardiovascular disorder resulting in a coronary occlusion. 
And, finally, in Klimas vs. Trans-Caribbean Airways, 10 N.Y. 
2d 209, 176 N.E. 2d 714, the Court held compensible an 
injury due to a heart attack by reason of mental disturbance 
and emotional distress from work activity. 
Over the years, Utah cases have clearly established the 
procedure for determining whether an accidental bodily injury 
occurred within the meaning of an accidental injury insur-
ance policy. These cases demonstrate that, absent some addi-
tional restricting language or exclusionary clause, recovery will 
be allowed where the Court determines, from the evidence that 
( 1) a bodily injury occurred, which includes such incidents as 
sunstroke (Richards) or cerebral vascular disorders (Thomp-
son) and ( 2) that bodily injury resulted from unusual stress 
and strain which, in turn, and without the design, consent, 
cooperation or actual expectation and prior knowledge of the 
Insured, caused the bodily injury. 
In the case at bar, the jury so found and, in accordance 
with those findings, rendered judgment for the Insured. 
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POINT III 
JUDGE ELTON'S DEATH WAS CAUSED BY 
ACCIDENT 
In Appellant's Point III, authority is cited from other 
jurisdictions wherein it has been held that coverage would not 
be afforded when the cause of death was brought about by a 
progressive disease. Many of these cases, for example, T omaiuoli 
vs. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, 75 H. ]. 
Super. 192, 182 Ore. 2d 582, involve a policy of insurance 
that had a provision stating that coverage is not effected if the 
loss is caused or contributed to by "disease". As pointed out in 
this Brief, the policy in this case has no such exclusion. To quote 
from such authority is of no help to the Court in this case. 
The Appellant, in its Brief, italicizes a portion of his 
quote from Couch On Insurance, 2nd Section 44:380. That 
portion doe~ not apply to the policy in this case. Rather, a 
prior sentence is applicable in this instance. That prior sen-
tence states: 
"Where, under a policy containing only the first 
phrase (the independent and exclusively phrase) the 
accidental injuries acts upon a pre-existing disease 
causing total disability which except for such disease 
would not have occurred, the injury is determined to 
be the proximate cause of the disability entitling re-
covery." (Parenthesis ours) 
In Point IV, under the discussion of the type of instruc-
tion given to the jury in this case, it should be pointed out 
that by Instruction No. 13 the Court required the jury to de-
termine whether or not the accident caused the death or the 
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disease caused the death. The jury verdict shows that they 
believed, based upon the evidence, the former. 
In Dienes vs. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 21 Utah 2d 
147, 442 P.2d 468 ( 1968), the Court examined a policy of 
insurance where the "exclusionary provision" was not that 
found in the "normal" policy. In discussing that unique pro-
vision, the Court quoted at length from Browning vs. Equitable 
Life Assurance, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, wherein the Court 
stated that since the Insurer is in a superior position, "the rule 
of strictissimi juris has been applied almost universally to in-
surance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, has 
declared in favor of a liberal construction in favor of the 
Insured* * * ". 
The Court further noted that most policies deny pay-
ment where death was caused in whole or in part from disease 
but that the exclusion in this case merely excluded benefits for 
"accidental death* * * caused by disease". The Court, held 
that the proper interpretation to be applied is that the Insured 
may recover if he died as a result of "injuriesJJ sustained by 
accident and stated that "it is no defense to the action that a 
normal person would not have died as a result of the injuries 
received". This Court, therefore, has construed strictly against 
the Insurer an exclusionary provision that was not a classical 
one. Certainly, the Appellant cannot now argue a contributory 
disease theory when there is no exclusion at all in the policy 
here. 
The recent Utah case of Whitlock vs. Old American In-
surance Company, 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.26 (1968), involv-
ed a case where there was an exclusion for "any mental or 
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bodily sickness or disease". The issue was whether or not the 
deceased died from the disease, from the injuries he received 
in the accident, or a combination of both. The Court stated 
that the defendant's argument was simply that if a person "in-
sured under an accident policy dies following an injury suf-
fered in an accident, if he had any diseased condition which in 
any degree contributed in causing his death, in that a more 
robust person would not have died from that injury, recovery 
is prevented by the exception in his policy". The Court, not-
withstanding an exclusionary provision in his policy (which is 
not present in the case at bar), rejected this reasoning. The 
Court stated: 
"If this narrow restriction were accepted and fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion it would in practical 
effect substantially cut away accident insurance cover-
age for people over middle age. A high percentage of 
them have some frailty or affliction from which they 
would die eventually and because of which an injury 
might more readily result in death than it would to a 
person not so afflicted. If this would prevent recovery 
under a accident policy the insurance sold to cover 
accidents would be put an illusion and acceptance of 
the premiwns a fraud ... 
. . . the insurer takes the insured as he is; that 
even though he may have some diseased condition 
which would eventually result in his death, or that 
the injury would not have resulted in death to a more 
robust person, if an accident occurs which hastens his 
death, recovery can be had under the policy. The critical 
question to be determined is whether the real and 
efficient cause, or as sometimes stated, the proximate 
cause of death was the disease, or the accident, and 
where the evidence would reasonably permit a finding 
either way, the issue is for the jury." 
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This Court in Whitlock cited with approval and as a 
basis for its holding Brooks vs. Metropolitan Li/ e Insurance 
Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 163 P.2d 689, and Gennari vs. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, (MO. 1960), 335 S.W. 2d 55. 
These cases clearly show that the law in this State is not that 
contended by the Appellant and does not restrictively view the 
concept of causation. 
"A case supporting this view which is close to 
our own on its facts is Brooks vs. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. Even though the deceased had had in-
curable cancer the Court stated that the presence of such 
a pre-existing disease would not relieve the insurer 
from liability if the accident was the prime or moving 
cause of the death. In Gennari vs. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of America the defendant company claimed that the 
death was caused by a prior condition of hypertensive 
cardiovascular disease and arteriosclerosis. The Court 
stated th'at 'It is well settled that although a person 
may have a weakened body * * * as the result of 
* * * disease, nonetheless if death is directly caused 
by * * * accidental means * * * recovery may be 
had * * * if he dies by reason of it, even if he would 
not have died if his previous health had been different. 
In such event the condition of previous health is mere-
ly predisposing and remote cause and not the direct, 
proximate cause, as contemplated by the policy, not-
withstanding such condition might have cooperated, 
concurred in and contributed to death.' " 
POINT IV 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED. 
The Appellant initially states in his Point IV that error 
was committed by the Court in that the instructions cited and 
particularly Instruction No. 10, indicated that the jury need 
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only find that "Leonard Elton was working hard at the time 
of his death and that this in some way contributed to or has-
tened his death" in order to sustain Plaintiff's theory. This, 
he alleges, allowed the jury to grant judgment for Respond-
ent even though they did not find unusual stress and even 
though they did not find that the stress constituted anything 
other than a mere "contributing factor" to his death. Each 
instruction, however, must be read in the context of the other 
instructions given by the Court. The Court instructed, in 
Instruction No. 13, as follows: 
"If you find from the evidence in this case, that 
prior to his death, Leonard W. Elton was suffering 
from arteriosclerosis or a heart condition and that his 
death was brought about by the natural progression of 
this disease or condition, then the Plaintiff may not 
recover in this case even though you should also find 
that the stress that he was under at the time of his 
death may have contributed to some extent to his death 
at the particular time in question, but did not in and of 
itself cause his death at that time." 
This instruction clearly placed the burden on Respondent 
which Appellant now claims the Court failed to do in In-
struction 10. The Court required by this instruction that re-
covery must be denied unless the jury found: ( 1) death was 
not "brought about by the natural progression of this disease", 
and ( 2) that the stress was more than simply a contributing 
cause and, in fact, did "in and of itself cause his death at that 
time". 
Appellant takes further exception to the Court's Instruc-
tion No. 10 alleging that the Instruction failed to indicate that 
the decedent had to die as a result of an accident. No single 
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instruction, however, can contain the entire theory of a law-
suit. Sufficient to say Instruction No. 7, given prior thereto, 
clearly indicated that the injury must be produced by accident. 
Objection is then made by Appellant to the description, within 
that instruction, of mental stress and strain. We have covered 
this Point earlier. It should be pointed out, however, that in 
Instruction No. 14 the Court defined with specificity the type 
of stress and strain that was necessary in order to constitute an 
accident. Instruction No. 14 as follows: 
"Even though you should find that Leonard W. 
Elton was under considerable stress at the time of his 
death and that such stress brought about his death, 
nevertheless the Plaintiff would not be entitled to re-
cover unless there was something unusual, unexpected, 
or out of the ordinary about the stress he was under at 
the time. All of us are subject to varying degrees of 
stress at different times in the course of our lives. More-
over, persons in certain professions or occupations are 
subjected to more stress than persons engaged in other 
occupations. Persons who are ill may be subjected to 
stress by the very nature of the illness or the conse-
quences of their illness. This is not the kind of stress 
which would justify an award in this case. The kind of 
stress we are talking about in this case is that which is 
unusual, unexpected, or not found in the ordinary af-
fairs of life." 
Finally, Appellant complains of the phrase "and without 
design, consent or cooperation of Leonard W. Elton", and 
contends that this is not an adequate definition of "accident". 
We cite Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New 
Yark, Supra., (which is relied upon by Appellant) which 
states: 
" ... an effect which the actor did not intend to pro-
duce, and which he cannot be charged with the design 
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of producing under the maxim to which we have ad-
verted (that every man must be held to intend the 
natural and probable consequence of his deeds) , is 
produced by accidental means. It is produced by means 
which were neither designed nor calculated to cause 
it < • • " 
\X'e submit, therefore, that instruction No. 10 was not 
erroneous, but rather, in all respects was proper. 
The Appellant also urges that the Court erred in refusing 
to admit the policy of insurance in evidence and in instructing 
the jury on the legal import of the policy in question. In the 
Court's Memorandum Decision, heretofore referred to (R. 
146), the Trial Judge stated that he "assumed the responsi-
bility imposed by Dienes vs. Safeco, and interpreted the Policy." 
In light of the language of Dienes vs. Safeco Life Insur-
ance Company, 21 Utah 2d, 147, 442 P.2d 468, it would ap-
pear that Appellant's argument is without merit. In that case, 
the Trial Court instructed the jury in the language of the 
policy. This Court held that, "by instructing in the language 
of the policy, the Trial Court erroneously permitted the jury 
to determine the legal effect therefrom" and reversed that 
case in part because of this error of the Trial Judge. The 
Dienes case was fully discussed during the trial of this matter 
and as stated earlier, was even cited by the Trial Judge in his 
Memorandum Decision. This action by the Court was in ac-
cordance with Utah law and, therefore this alleged error has 
no merit. 
Instruction No. 9 was also objected to by Appellant be-
cause it failed to adequately define "accident". Again, we refer 
the Court to Instruction No. 14 which does define "accident" 
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under this case and which evidently the Appellant does not ob-
ject to. Instruction No. 9 merely states the general law. See 55 
Am. Jur. 2d Section 1219 P.65. And it is in conformity with 
the Utah cases that we have heretofore cited. 
The Appellant further objects to Instruction No. 16 which 
1s the standard proximate cause definition found in J.I.F.U., 
15. 7. A central issue in this case was, of course, the cause of 
death of the decedent. In Whitlock vs. Old American Insur-
ance Company, 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26 (1968), in a 
case involving the typical disease exclusionary provision, the 
Court explained that, even with such a provision, the Insurer 
takes the Insured as he is and that, "The critical question to 
be determined is whether the real and efficient cause, or as 
sometimes stated, the proximate cause of death was the dis-
ease, or the accident, and where the evidence would reasonably 
permit a finding either way, the issue is for the jury." (P. 28, 
emphasis ours) . 
Since the Appellant was urging that this was a case where 
death was caused by a progressive disease and the Respondent 
was urging that the real cause was the accident, certainly this 
instruction on proximate cause was and is relevant and material. 
The Appellant also objects to Instruction Nos. 17 and 
18. The Appellant at the trial level, as it is doing now, vigor-
ously argued that there was a voluntary exposure to danger 
and, as such, there is no liability. This is not the law. In this 
regard, in Richards vs. Standard Accident Insurance Compt#ny, 
Supra., the Court states as follows: 
"But negligence is not here involved. Under this 
Policy it is not a defense which the Appellant may in-
voke. 
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Neither is 'voluntary exposure to danger' a de-
fense. The Policy does not contain such a provision. 
Unless the deceased intended to produce the very 
result which occurred, the element of danger is both 
unimportant and immaterial. .. " 
This case and the quoted portion thereof not only limits 
the appellant's claims that Instruction Nos. 17 and 18 were 
in error but further negates his argument that Judge Elton's 
widow cannot recover the benefits of this policy due to some 
misplaced reliance on a theory of foreseeability. 
12: 
The Appellant also objects to the Court's Instruction No. 
"You are instructed that it is no defense to this 
action that a normal person would not have died as a 
result of the injuries received and also it is not a de-
fense to this action that Leonard W. Elton at the time 
of his death was suffering from arteriosclerosis." 
and alleges error for failure to give his requested Instruction 
No. 4 which requires that the accident itself must be sufficient 
to cause damage to one of the organs of the body. Appellant's 
requested instruction was not given because it simply is not 
the law. Utah law is clearly in accordance with Instruction 
No. 12. In Whitlock vs. Old American Insurance Company, 
Supra., the Court explained: 
"It is generally held that insofar as coverage for 
accidents is concerned, the Insurer takes the Insured as 
he is, that even though he may have had some diseased 
condition which eventually results in his death, or that 
the injury would not have resulted in death of a more 
robllst person, if an accident occurs which hastens his 
death recovery can be had under the Policy." 
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Also, see Dienes vs. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 
Supra., which states: 
"It is no defense to the action the claim that a 
normal person would not have died as a result of the 
injuries received. Even though the Life of the Insured 
hangs by a precarious thread, the beneficiaries under 
this type of Policy can recover when death results from 
injuries and would not have occurred at that time ex-
cept for those injuries." 
The instruction requested by the Defendant sets forth the 
proposition that the accident itself must be of sufficient trauma 
to, in and of itself, cause death to a "normal" person. That is 
not the law and the giving of the instruction would have been 
error. The issue of the cause of death was clearly before this 
Court in Instruction No. 13 as earlier set forth. Thus, Instruc-
tion No. 12 was a proper instruction and was required by the 
Utah cases. 
In summary, the instructions, when read in their entirety, 
properly presented the theories of both parties, clearly stated 
the law and allowed the jury to determine the appropriate 
factual issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Elton died on the 13th day of May 1970. An 
autopsy revealed that his death was caused by a cerebra-vascular 
accident and that he also had an underlying severe vascular 
disease. The medical evidence revealed that marked physical 
and emotional stress resulting from an overwhelming work 
load, interspersed with sensitive cases, during the last six 
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weeks of his life, "most probably markedly aggravated the 
underlying condition and did indeed precipitate the Decedent's 
death." 
The language of the insurance policy entitles the benefi-
ciary to recover if the loss occurred as a result of "accidental 
bodily injury." We have pointed out that said policy is unique 
in that it does not contain such exclusionary provisions as the 
"external, violent, and accidental" provision, or the "visible 
wound or contusion" provision, or the "sickness or bodily in-
firmity" exclusionary provision. Nor does it contain a limiting 
definition of the words "accidental bodily injury" as is the 
situation in a number of the cases cited by counsel for Appel-
lant. Therefore, what is basically at issue here is whether a fact 
question was made out by the evidence as to whether Judge 
Elton died as a result of an "accidental injury." If it was, and 
the trial court properly submitted the issues to the jury, then 
the verdict should be allowed to stand. 
The law of Utah is clear that physical failures brought 
on by unusual stresses and strains fall within the meaning of 
the term "accident." This is the ruling in Workmen's Compen-
sation cases. See Powers 'l!'. Industrial Commission, supra. It is 
the ruling in Insurance coverage cases. See Thompson v. Amer-
ican Casualty Company, supra. It is also the ruling in Re-
tirement Board cases. See Inga-Lill Elton v. Utah State Re-
tirement Board, supra. And as was said in the case of Richards 
v. Standard Life, supra, "resorting to subtle and refined dis-
tinctions" can serve no useful purpose in determining such 
issues as whether a "bodily injury" has occurred. 
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The trial court presented to the jury the issue of whether 
Judge Elton died as a result of an accident or whether he died 
as a result of the natural progression of an underlying vascular 
disease. See Instruction No. 13. That issue was resolved 
against Appellant by the jury's verdict. 
All life hangs on a slender thread. We await the inevit-
able hour when the superimposition of some final burden 
snuffs out the flame. The final burden in Judge Elton's life 
was a six-week struggle with an unusually difficult and at 
times overwhelming work load. His life was cut short by that 
burden. Utah law declares that he died as a result of an acci-
dent and that his beneficiary should recover. As was said by 
this Court in Whitlock vs. Old American Insurance Company, 
supra.: 
" ... the insurer takes the insured as he is; - - -
even though he may have some diseased condition 
which would eventually result in his death, or that the 
injury would not have resulted in death to a more 
robust person, if an accident occurs which hastens his 
death, recovery can be had under the policy." 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert D. Moore. 
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